Implementer guide — implementing PID presentations with OpenID4VP¶

Audience: Relying Parties implementing an OpenID4VP flow to enable the consumption of a PID credential in the German EUDI Wallet Ecosystem.

Contents¶

Introduction
Concepts and Validation Layers
Building a PID Presentation Request
Interpreting the PID Presentation Response

1. Introduction¶

This guide targets implementers of OpenID4VP to support PID presentations in the German EUDI Ecosystem. Following this short introduction, Chapter 2 explains the security concepts and validation layers that make PID presentations trustworthy. Chapter 3 shows the structure of a PID Presentation Request and how to construct one correctly. Chapter 4 explains the response structure and provides a complete validation checklist.

The specification that forms the basis for this documentation can be found in the Blueprint for the German EUDI Wallet Ecosystem.

Throughout this guide, rules or optionality specific to Germany will be called out. Notes have been added with information specific to Sandbox participation.

2. Concepts and Validation Layers¶

This chapter explains the foundations of PID (Person Identification Data) presentation as defined by the ARF PID Rulebook and realized through the OpenID4VP High Assurance Interoperability Profile (HAIP). It covers the security concepts that make PID presentations trustworthy, then explains the validation layers that implement these concepts in practice.

2.1 Trust Anchors and Governance¶

Everything in PID verification begins with the trust framework. Before any cryptographic validation is done, the verifier must know which issuers it is allowed to trust and which certificate hierarchies govern PID issuance. This prevents the acceptance of PID data from unrecognized or malicious sources. In the eIDAS context, this usually means the use of trust lists.

German PID Provider

In Germany, there is only one PID Provider (Bundesdruckerei). For the purpose of Sandbox testing, we provide mock trust lists

2.2 Authenticity of PID Credentials¶

Once trust anchors are known, the verifier evaluates whether the PID itself was authentically issued. PIDs include signatures created by the issuing authority. Validating these signatures against the keys from the trust framework establishes that the data presented by the wallet corresponds to a genuine PID record and has not been modified since issuance. This ensures that the identifier information originates from the correct governmental entity and is in an unaltered state.

2.3 Holder Binding¶

Even if the PID was authentically issued, the verifier must ensure that the wallet instance presenting it is the same wallet that the PID was issued into. This is called Holder Binding or Key Binding. A detailed discussion can be found in the SD-JWT specification; it is applicable in general to all credential formats.

During the presentation, the wallet signs the presented credential along with information bound to the particular presentation (see below) in the VP Token. The signature is performed with a private key that is tied to the secure wallet instance and for which the corresponding public key is contained in the Issuer-signed credential. This ensures the presentation comes from a valid wallet on a valid device, not from an exported credential or a cloned environment.

Without holder binding, an intercepted presentation, a malicious verifier, a cloned backup, or a compromised device could be used to impersonate someone. The holder-binding bridges the gap between "this is a valid PID" and "this PID is being presented by the right person". The signature produced by the wallet cannot be replayed or forged without access to the protected key material.

2.4 Session and Transaction Binding¶

A high-assurance PID presentation must be tied explicitly to the verifier’s session. The verifier generates a cryptographically strong nonce and embeds it in the presentation request. The wallet then includes this nonce in the proof-of-possession signature along with information about the verifier's identity and a timestamp. When the verifier later validates the response, it confirms that the presentation is fresh and could only have been created in response to its own request, mitigating phishing and replay attacks.

2.5 Selective Disclosure and Data Minimization¶

The ARF mandates that verifiers request only the attributes they genuinely need. HAIP and the underlying credential formats (SD-JWT or mDoc) allow the wallet to disclose only these attributes selectively. The verifier cannot collect anything outside its stated purpose, and over disclosed elements should be ignored.

Validation Philosophy¶

Validation should follow a fail-fast, layered approach:

Foundational checks first (trust, transport, session binding)
Cryptographic assurance next (credential validity, holder binding)
Privacy and policy enforcement next (selective disclosure)
Business logic last

If any layer fails, validation should stop immediately. Continuing after a critical failure increases attack surface and risks incorrect authorization decisions.

Layer 1: Trust and Transport¶

Before interpreting any protocol data, the verifier must establish a trusted baseline.

At this layer, the verifier conceptually validates that: - Trust anchors for PID issuers and wallet providers are loaded from an official, trusted registry - Trust lists are authentic, fresh, and correctly parsed - Communication occurs over secure transport (HTTPS with valid TLS) - The received payload is of the expected type and within reasonable size limits

Layer 2: Session Binding¶

The verifier must ensure that the response is cryptographically bound to its own request.

At this layer, the verifier validates that: - A nonce is present and exactly matches the verifier-issued nonce - The audience (aud) identifies the verifier and matches the request - Timestamps (iat, exp) are present, valid, and within an acceptable freshness window

This layer prevents replay attacks, phishing, and cross-session injection.

Layer 3: Holder Binding¶

Even a valid PID credential is insufficient unless it is presented by its rightful holder.

At this layer, the verifier conceptually validates that:

A proof-of-possession mechanism is present
The proof is cryptographically valid
The proof binds the presentation to the verifier’s nonce, the verifier’s identifier (audience), and the presented credential.
The signing key is correctly associated with the PID’s holder binding mechanism

Layer 4: Credential Assurance¶

The verifier must confirm that the presented PID credential itself is genuine and valid.

At this layer, the verifier validates that:

A PID credential is present and extractable from the presentation
The credential format is supported (SD-JWT or mDoc)
Issuer signatures are valid
The issuer is trusted according to the loaded trust anchors
The credential is within its validity period and not revoked
The credential type matches what was requested

Layer 5: Selective Disclosure and Data Minimization¶

PID verification is subject to strict data minimization requirements.

At this layer, the verifier validates that:

Only attributes explicitly requested are disclosed
All mandatory attributes for the transaction are present
No additional credentials are included
The disclosed credential combination matches one of the allowed credential sets

Layer 6: Business Rules and Policy Enforcement¶

Only after all assurance layers succeed should the verifier apply business logic.

At this layer, the verifier validates that:

Required attributes are present and usable
Attribute values satisfy business requirements
Data quality and completeness meet application expectations
A clear authorization- and or business decision can be derived and audited

Wallet Integrity

Wallet integrity is established during the issuance process through a Wallet Unit Attestation. The issuer ensures that the PID is only issued into valid wallets. During presentation, the verifier relies on that established trust implicitly.

3. Building a PID Presentation Request¶

This chapter explains the structure of a PID Presentation Request and how to construct one correctly. It covers what a wallet receives when it calls a request_uri and how to understand a HAIP-aligned PID Presentation Request. The examples below are illustrative but structurally realistic for the German PID profile.

3.1 HTTPS Response When Dereferencing `request_uri`¶

When the wallet fetches the Presentation Request referenced by the request_uri, the verifier responds with a JSON object containing the actual Presentation Request. In HAIP-aligned deployments, this request is typically a pushed signed request object (PAR).

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
eyJ0eXAiOiJvYXV0aC1hdXRoei1yZXErand0IiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYiLCJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQ2N6Q0NBaGlnQXdJQkFnSVVPeEQ3SkZrS1lnRlBrOEozWm1Tc0VDMkJIazR3Q2dZSUtvWkl6ajBFQXdJd0tERUxNQWtHQTFVRUJoTUNSRVV4R1RBWEJnTlZCQU1NRUVkbGNtMWhiaUJTWldkcGMzUnlZWEl3SGhjTk1qWXdNVEkzTURreU9ETTFXaGNOTWpjd01USTNNRGt5T0RNMVdqQmZNUXN3Q1FZRFZRUUdFd0pFUlRFWU1CWUdBMVVFQ2d3UFJWVkVTU0JRYkdGNVozSnZkVzVrTVJ3d0dnWURWUVJoREJORVJTNDBPRGN6TlRKRE1FWTJNVGN4UTBRek1SZ3dGZ1lEVlFRRERBOUZWVVJKSUZCc1lYbG5jbTkxYm1Rd1dUQVRCZ2NxaGtqT1BRSUJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFSdEFiL3d2MXYyTXJHKzNDSE1sQmFnQXgwQ1NXL0IzNUZWQThkTC9DdjRYWG81ZU9xeHl0c1dlQThmbHFLamRhNjBnTTdnWVF4MUpWMEJ3akRQbVIwK280SG9NSUhsTUF3R0ExVWRFd0VCL3dRQ01BQXdIUVlEVlIwT0JCWUVGRXlpMG1VSFRnVmFCTDRHRS9ZeTlRQ1EvMXdHTUI4R0ExVWRJd1FZTUJhQUZLbkNvOW92YmF4VTdzNjVUdWdzeVN3QWc0QXpNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQVNCZ05WSFNVRUN6QUpCZ2NvZ1l4ZEJRRUdNQ1VHQTFVZEVRUWVNQnlDR25Cc1lYbG5jbTkxYm1RdVpYVmthUzEzWVd4c1pYUXViM0puTUVvR0ExVWRId1JETUVFd1A2QTlvRHVHT1doMGRIQnpPaTh2YzJGdVpHSnZlQzVsZFdScExYZGhiR3hsZEM1dmNtY3ZZWEJwTDNOMFlYUjFjeTF0WVc1aFoyVnRaVzUwTDJOeWJEQUtCZ2dxaGtqT1BRUURBZ05KQURCR0FpRUFrbmsydkd0MUw4cGU2RXR0elhKMlIxdHVlRm5kQ1RVNDJFYUlSbGo5MlRvQ0lRRGova0ZmcldpN2p5UXRLbVNLb3JIY0JsWGluV09uRGtXLzZwQU5tZ1hHZGc9PSJdfQ.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.2VHx61tIyHCisIXq3v_QoDpOxMBVHs7R5K0qOlIRwc5FgP-O0Q0qVhBgt6Sr-1SmN9u2jinH4Fx7lIav5J4p6g
}

The wallet receives a single signed request object (JAR) rather than individual parameters. The signature allows the wallet to verify authenticity, and cache-control headers prevent reuse.

3.2 Example PID Presentation Request (Decoded)¶

Below is the decoded content of the Presentation Request contained in the signed request object. Line breaks and formatting are added for readability. Each field is annotated with a number (1) that corresponds to the explanation table below.

{
  "response_type": "vp_token",                          // (1)
  "client_id": "x509_hash:fQuobVwJv000vDWcMtriXPzo2sPTm5_Mp10O87lCqcE", // (2)
  "response_uri": "https://playground.eudi-wallet.org/eudiplo/3aa4706c-6f35-47b8-8a05-6a0a334c301d/oid4vp", // (3)
  "response_mode": "direct_post.jwt",                   // (4)
  "nonce": "85d5e24a-7163-4e44-a0ed-94be98cab666",        // (5)

  "dcql_query": {                                       // (6)
    "credentials": [
      {
        "id": "pid-sd-jwt",                              // (7)
        "format": "dc+sd-jwt",                           // (8)
        "claims": [                                     // (9)
          {"path": ["given_name"]},                      // (10)
          {"path": ["family_name"]},                     // (11)
          {"path": ["birthdate"]},                       // (12)
          {"path": ["address", "street_address"]},       // (13)
          {"path": ["address", "postal_code"]},          // (14)
          {"path": ["address", "locality"]},             // (15)
          {"path": ["address", "country"]},              // (16)
          {"path": ["nationalities"]}                    // (17)
        ],
        "meta": {
          "vct_values": ["urn:eudi:pid:de:1"]             // (18)
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "pid-mso-mdoc",                             // (19)
        "format": "mso_mdoc",                             // (20)
        "claims": [
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "given_name"]},      // (21)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "family_name"]},     // (22)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "birth_date"]},      // (23)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "resident_street"]}, // (24)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "resident_postal_code"]}, // (25)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "resident_city"]},   // (26)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "resident_country"]},// (27)
          {"path": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1", "nationality"]}      // (28)
        ],
        "meta": {
          "doctype_value": "eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1"       // (29)
        }
      }
    ],
    "credential_sets": [
      {
        "options": [
          ["pid-sd-jwt"],                                 // (30)
          ["pid-mso-mdoc"]                                // (31)
        ]
      }
    ]
  },

  "client_metadata": {                                   // (32)
    "jwks": {
      "keys": [
        {
          "kty": "EC",                                   // (33)
          "crv": "P-256",                                // (34)
          "x": "ShU4Fr3NH7v9TOAc9aYiu9eicdkfVT9ecVCPaPgJrMs", // (35)
          "y": "iV0VXASylR0qWoDr_mKUWwzo-M59Wz3QBzpCm4oiXT0", // (36)
          "alg": "ECDH-ES",                               // (37)
          "kid": "a420ee83-ecfa-44fc-bb16-80320d87f745"    // (38)
        }
      ]
    },
    "vp_formats_supported": {                             // (39)
      "mso_mdoc": {
        "alg": ["ES256", "Ed25519"]                       // (40)
      },
      "dc+sd-jwt": {
        "kb-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "Ed25519"],        // (41)
        "sd-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "Ed25519"]         // (42)
      }
    },
    "encrypted_response_enc_values_supported": ["A128GCM"] // (43)
  },

  "state": "3aa4706c-6f35-47b8-8a05-6a0a334c301d",         // (44)
  "aud": "https://self-issued.me/v2",                     // (45)
  "exp": 1769513697,                                      // (46)
  "iat": 1769510097                                       // (47)
}

Field-by-Field Explanation¶

#	Field	Purpose	Notes
(1)	`response_type`	Response type	Must be `vp_token` for OpenID4VP.
(2)	`client_id`	Verifier identifier	Uses `x509_hash:` scheme per HAIP; hash binds request to verifier certificate.
(3)	`response_uri`	Response endpoint	HTTPS endpoint where wallet posts the `vp_token`.
(4)	`response_mode`	Response delivery	`direct_post.jwt` is mandatory for HAIP high-assurance flows.
(5)	`nonce`	Session binding	Cryptographically random value preventing replay attacks.
(6)	`dcql_query`	Credential query	Defines which credentials and attributes are requested.
(7)	`credentials[].id`	Credential identifier	Used to reference credentials in `credential_sets`.
(8)	`credentials[].format`	Credential format	`dc+sd-jwt` for SD-JWT VC format.
(9)	`claims`	Requested claims	List of attributes to be selectively disclosed.
(10–17)	`claims[].path`	Claim paths (SD-JWT)	JSON path segments into the SD-JWT payload.
(18)	`meta.vct_values`	Credential type	Identifies German PID VC (`urn:eudi:pid:de:1`).
(19)	`credentials[].id`	Credential identifier	Identifier for mDoc PID request.
(20)	`credentials[].format`	Credential format	ISO/IEC 18013-5 mDoc format.
(21–28)	`claims[].path`	Claim paths (SD-JWT)	Namespace + attribute name as defined in PID mDoc profile.
(29)	`meta.doctype_value`	Document type	Identifies the PID mDoc document type.
(30)	`credential_sets.options[0]`	Option 1	Wallet may respond using mDOc PID.
(31)	`credential_sets.options[1]`	Option 2	Wallet may respond using SD-JWT PID.
(32)	`client_metadata`	Verifier metadata	Provides encryption keys and supported formats.
(33)	`jwks.keys[].kty`	Key type	Elliptic Curve key.
(34)	`jwks.keys[].crv`	Curve	P-256 curve (secp256r1).
(35)	`jwks.keys[].x`	Public key X	Base64url-encoded coordinate.
(36)	`jwks.keys[].y`	Public key Y	Base64url-encoded coordinate.
(37)	`jwks.keys[].alg`	Key algorithm	Used for ECDH encryption of response.
(38)	`jwks.keys[].kid`	Key ID	Used by wallet to select encryption key.
(39)	`vp_formats_supported`	Format capabilities	Declares supported VP formats and algorithms.
(40)	`vp_formats_supported.mso_mdoc.alg`	mDoc algorithms	Algorithms supported for mDoc signatures.
(41)	`kb-jwt_alg_values`	Holder binding algs	Algorithms supported for key binding JWT.
(42)	`sd-jwt_alg_values`	SD-JWT algs	Algorithms supported for SD-JWT issuer signatures.
(43)	`encrypted_response_enc_values_supported`	Encryption	Symmetric encryption algorithms supported.
(44)	`state`	CSRF protection	Returned unmodified in the response.
(45)	`aud`	Audience	Fixed value for HAIP aligned responses.
(46)	`exp`	Expiration	Limits lifetime of request object.
(47)	`iat`	Issued-at	Used for freshness validation.

3.3 Request Construction Checklist¶

Before sending a Presentation Request, verify that your request includes all elements needed for a PID presentation:

Field	Validation	Failure Action
`iss`	Present and matches your verifier identifier	Request will be rejected
`aud`	Present and correctly targets the wallet	Request will be rejected
`iat`	Present and current timestamp	Request will be rejected if expired
`exp`	Present and set to reasonable future time (5-10 min)	Request will be rejected if expired
`client_id`	Present and uses correct scheme (e.g., `x509_hash:`)	Request will be rejected
`response_type`	Set to `"vp_token"`	Request will be rejected
`response_mode`	Set to `"direct_post.jwt"` for HAIP	Request will be rejected
`nonce`	Present, cryptographically random, unique per request	Security risk: replay attacks possible
`client_metadata.jwks`	Contains valid encryption key	Response cannot be encrypted
`verifier_info`	Contains valid registration certificate	Wallet will reject untrusted verifier
`response_uri`	Valid HTTPS URL, accessible by wallet	Response cannot be delivered
`dcql_query.credentials`	At least one credential specified	No data will be returned
`dcql_query.credentials[].format`	Valid format (`dc+sd-jwt` or `mso_mdoc`)	Request will be rejected
`dcql_query.credentials[].claims`	At least one claim per credential	Credential will be empty
Request object signature	Request object is properly signed (JAR)	Wallet will reject unsigned request

Nonce Security

The nonce must be cryptographically random and unique per request. Reusing nonces enables replay attacks. Generate using a cryptographically secure random number generator.

Expiration Time

Set exp to 5-10 minutes after iat. Too short may cause timeouts; too long increases security risk if the request is intercepted.

4. Interpreting the PID Presentation Response¶

This chapter explains the structure of the PID Presentation Response and provides a complete validation checklist. It covers what the verifier receives at the response_uri, how to interpret the vp_token structure, and how to validate it using the validation layers described in Chapter 2.

4.1 Receiving the Presentation Response¶

When the wallet has satisfied the Presentation Request and the user has consented, it sends the response to the verifier’s response_uri. In a HAIP-aligned flow using direct_post.jwt, this happens as a HTTPS POST.

A typical HTTP interaction looks like this:

POST /response HTTP/1.1
Host: response.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

response=eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOEdDTSIsImtpZCI6ImFjIn0...

The response parameter contains an encrypted JWT (JWE). The verifier should treat this object as opaque until basic transport-level checks (TLS, content type, size limits) have passed.

4.2 High-Level Structure of the Response¶

The presentation response structure with direct_post.jwt consists of:

Outer Layer (Encrypted Response): - An encrypted JWT (JWE) containing the entire response - Encrypted using the verifier's public key (from the request's client_metadata.jwks) - After decryption, contains session binding claims (nonce, aud, iat, exp, state) and the vp_token

Inner Layer (vp_token): - For SD-JWT: A signed credential in the format <Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~...~<Disclosure N>~<KB-JWT> - For mDoc: CBOR-encoded credential with deviceAuth structure - The vp_token itself is NOT encrypted separately - it's simply included in the encrypted response payload

Response Encryption

The entire response is encrypted as a single JWE. The vp_token inside is a signed (not encrypted) credential format. This prevents "double encryption" which would be unnecessary.

4.3 Response Validation Checklist¶

The checklist below provides a complete validation workflow for the PID presentation response. It follows the validation layers described in Chapter 2, proceeding in order from transport checks through business rules. Each layer builds on the previous one, following a fail-fast principle: reject immediately upon any validation failure to save processing time and reduce attack surface.

Important: With direct_post.jwt response mode, the entire response is encrypted as a JWE. The vp_token inside is a signed credential (SD-JWT or mDoc), NOT separately encrypted. Decryption must happen before session binding can be validated.

For detailed explanations of why each check matters, refer back to the corresponding validation layer in Chapter 2.

Step	Check	Implementation	Failure Action
1. Transport Layer
1.1	Verify HTTPS connection	Confirm TLS 1.2+ is used and server certificate is valid	Reject: Insecure transport
1.2	Check content type	Verify `Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded` header is present	Reject: Wrong content type
1.3	Verify payload size	Confirm payload is within reasonable limits (e.g., < 1MB) to prevent DoS	Optionally reject: Payload too large
2. Decrypt Response
2.1	Extract response parameter	Parse the POST body and extract the `response` parameter value	Reject: Missing response parameter
2.2	Parse JWE structure	Verify the response has valid JWE format (five base64url-encoded parts)	Reject: Malformed JWE
2.3	Decode JWE header	Parse JWE header as valid JSON and extract `alg`, `enc`, and `kid` fields	Reject: Invalid JWE header
2.4	Verify encryption algorithm	Confirm `alg` is in allowed list (e.g., `ECDH-ES`) and `enc` is supported (e.g., `A128GCM`)	Reject: Unsupported encryption
2.5	Decrypt response	Use your private key (matching the public key sent in request `client_metadata.jwks`) to decrypt the JWE	Reject: Decryption failed
2.6	Parse decrypted payload	Parse the decrypted plaintext as valid JSON	Reject: Invalid payload structure
3. Session Binding
3.1	Extract `nonce` from payload	Locate `nonce` claim in decrypted response payload	Reject: Missing nonce
3.2	Compare nonce with request	Verify nonce matches exactly (byte-for-byte) the nonce from your original request	Reject: Nonce mismatch
3.3	Extract `aud` from payload	Locate `aud` claim in decrypted response payload	Reject: Missing audience
3.4	Verify audience matches verifier	Confirm `aud` matches your verifier's `client_id` from the request	Reject: Wrong audience
3.5	Extract `iat` timestamp	Locate `iat` (issued-at) claim in decrypted response payload	Reject: Missing timestamp
3.6	Extract `exp` timestamp	Locate `exp` (expiration) claim in decrypted response payload	Reject: Missing expiration
3.7	Verify timestamp validity	Confirm current time is between `iat` and `exp` (accounting for clock skew, e.g., ±30s)	Reject: Expired or not yet valid
3.8	Check response freshness	Verify `iat` is within acceptable window from request time (e.g., last 5 minutes)	Reject: Response too old
3.9	Extract `state` (if used)	If `state` was included in your request, locate it in decrypted response payload and verify it matches	Reject: State mismatch
4. Holder Binding
4.1	Extract `vp_token`	Locate the `vp_token` field in decrypted response payload	Reject: Missing vp_token
4.2	Verify credential format matches request	Confirm vp_token format (SD-JWT with `~` separators or mDoc CBOR) matches the format you requested in `dcql_query`	Reject: Wrong credential format
4.3	SD-JWT: Extract credential	Extract the issuer-signed JWT (first part before `~`)	Reject: Cannot extract credential
4.4	SD-JWT: Parse credential structure	Decode credential JWT header and payload	Reject: Malformed credential
4.5	SD-JWT: Extract holder's public key	Extract `cnf.jwk` claim from credential payload per RFC 7800	Reject: Missing cnf claim
4.6	SD-JWT: Extract KB-JWT	Extract the KB-JWT (last element after final `~`)	Reject: Missing KB-JWT
4.7	SD-JWT: Parse KB-JWT structure	Decode KB-JWT header and payload	Reject: Malformed KB-JWT
4.8	SD-JWT: Verify KB-JWT audience	Confirm `aud` in KB-JWT matches your verifier identifier	Reject: Wrong KB-JWT audience
4.9	SD-JWT: Verify KB-JWT nonce	Confirm `nonce` in KB-JWT matches the nonce from your request	Reject: KB-JWT nonce mismatch
4.10	SD-JWT: Verify KB-JWT timestamp	Confirm `iat` in KB-JWT is recent and consistent with response `iat` from step 3.5	Reject: Invalid KB-JWT timestamp
4.11	SD-JWT: Verify KB-JWT signature	Verify the KB-JWT signature using the public key extracted in step 4.5	Reject: Invalid holder binding signature
4.12	SD-JWT: Verify hash binding	Confirm KB-JWT's `sd_hash` matches SHA-256 hash of the presentation (issuer-signed JWT + `~` + disclosures)	Reject: Hash mismatch
4.13	mDoc: Validate holder binding	Validate deviceAuth and holder binding in accordance with ISO 18013-5 specification	Reject: Invalid mDoc holder binding
5. Credential Validation
5.1	SD-JWT: Identify credential type	Verify `vct` claim matches requested PID type (e.g., `urn:eudi:pid:de:1`)	Reject: Wrong credential type
5.2	SD-JWT: Extract issuer identifier	Extract `iss` claim from credential payload	Reject: Missing issuer
5.3	SD-JWT: Verify issuer is trusted	Look up issuer in your loaded trust list (PID providers) and verify it is authorized to issue PIDs	Reject: Untrusted issuer
5.4	SD-JWT: Extract issuer's public key	Retrieve issuer's public key from trust list or from credential's `x5c` chain in credential header	Reject: Cannot find issuer key
5.5	SD-JWT: Verify issuer signature	Verify the credential signature using issuer's public key	Reject: Invalid credential signature
5.6	SD-JWT: Verify credential validity	Check `iat`, `exp` claims and confirm credential is currently valid (accounting for clock skew)	Reject: Expired credential
5.7	SD-JWT: Check revocation status	Query revocation mechanism (status list, OCSP, or CRL) to confirm credential is not revoked	Reject: Revoked credential
5.8	SD-JWT: Verify certificate chain	If issuer uses X.509 certificates (`x5c` in header), verify the full chain up to trust anchor and check certificate validity	Reject: Invalid certificate chain
5.9	mDoc: Validate credential	Validate mDoc credential structure, issuer signature, trust, and validity in accordance with ISO 18013-5 specification	Reject: Invalid mDoc credential
6. Selective Disclosure
6.1	SD-JWT: Extract disclosures	Parse all disclosed attributes from the SD-JWT (elements between `~` separators, excluding issuer-signed JWT and KB-JWT)	Reject: Cannot parse disclosures
6.2	SD-JWT: Verify disclosure integrity	Verify each disclosure's hash matches the corresponding `_sd` hash in the issuer-signed JWT	Reject: Disclosure tampering detected
6.3	mDoc: Validate selective disclosure	Validate disclosed namespaces and elements in accordance with ISO 18013-5 specification	Reject: Invalid mDoc disclosures
6.4	Compare with requested claims	Check that all disclosed claims were explicitly requested in your `dcql_query`	Warning: Extra claims disclosed
6.5	Verify mandatory claims present	Confirm all claims you marked as mandatory in your request are present in the response	Reject: Missing mandatory claims
6.6	Verify credential set compliance (if used)	If `credential_sets` was used in your request, confirm the combination of credentials received matches one of the options	Reject: Invalid credential combination
6.7	Check for over-disclosure	Verify no additional credentials beyond what was requested are included in the response	Warning: Unexpected credentials
7. Business Rules
7.1	Validate attribute formats	Verify each disclosed claim value conforms to expected data types and formats (dates, strings, structured data)	Reject: Invalid attribute format
7.2	Evaluate business requirements	Apply your application-specific logic (e.g., age >= 18, nationality checks, address validation)	Reject: Business rule violation
7.3	Check data completeness	Verify all attributes needed for your use case are present and non-empty	Reject: Incomplete data
7.4	Record authorization decision	Log the validation outcome, disclosed attributes (respecting privacy), and authorization decision for audit purposes	N/A

Fail-Fast Principle

Reject immediately upon any validation failure that is more severe than a warning. Do not continue validation after a critical failure (e.g., signature verification). This prevents information leakage and reduces processing costs.

4.4 Failure Handling and Diagnostics¶

Verifier implementations should provide clear diagnostics internally. Common rejection points include:

Signature verification failure
Nonce or audience mismatch
Unsupported credential format
Missing or extra disclosed attributes
Invalid or untrusted wallet attestation

While error details should not be exposed to the wallet or user, precise internal logging is essential for debugging interoperability issues.

Implementer guide — implementing PID presentations with OpenID4VP¶

Contents¶

1. Introduction¶

2. Concepts and Validation Layers¶

2.1 Trust Anchors and Governance¶

2.2 Authenticity of PID Credentials¶

2.3 Holder Binding¶

2.4 Session and Transaction Binding¶

2.5 Selective Disclosure and Data Minimization¶

Validation Philosophy¶

Layer 1: Trust and Transport¶

Layer 2: Session Binding¶

Layer 3: Holder Binding¶

Layer 4: Credential Assurance¶

Layer 5: Selective Disclosure and Data Minimization¶

Layer 6: Business Rules and Policy Enforcement¶

3. Building a PID Presentation Request¶

3.1 HTTPS Response When Dereferencing request_uri¶

3.2 Example PID Presentation Request (Decoded)¶

Field-by-Field Explanation¶

3.3 Request Construction Checklist¶

4. Interpreting the PID Presentation Response¶

4.1 Receiving the Presentation Response¶

4.2 High-Level Structure of the Response¶

4.3 Response Validation Checklist¶

4.4 Failure Handling and Diagnostics¶

3.1 HTTPS Response When Dereferencing `request_uri`¶