2.2 Data Register¶
This chapter comprises a register of all data that is exchanged between the components listed in the decomposition.
In the following table all data is listed with the following information:
- Name: Name of the data by which the data is referenced in the sequence diagrams.
- Processors: Which role or component processes the data
- Contains: What data is contained in complex data types
- Description: Short description of the purpose of the data
The name of data is made up of domain, purpose and type of the data, separated by an underscore:
- Domain: Acronym in lower case of a component or role from the decomposition that produces or controls the data, as
introduced above, e.g.
ppfor PID Provider - Purpose: Description of the purpose or content of the data in one (maximum two) strings.
- Type: For complex data types the type results from purpose and does not have to be specified separately. Furthermore,
we differentiate:
- prvk - for a private key of asymmetric key pair
- pubk - for a public key of asymmetric key pair
- pop - for a proof of possession of a private key of asymmetric key pair
- symk - for a symmetric key
- id - for an identifier
- nonce - for a number used only once
With regard to data processing, we distinguish between:
- P - producer of the data
- L - long-term storage of the data
- LE - long-term storage of the data but encrypted at rest, involves processing the data in unencrypted form in volatile memory
- LH - long-term storage of the data but hardware backed
- in case of the Wallet Instance, this is the local Hardware Key Store (HKS), e.g. TEE, Strongbox, Secure Enclave
- in case of Wallet Backend, PID Provider, EAA Provider and optionally Relying Party, this is an Hardware Security Module (HSM).
- in case of RWSCA, the Hardware Security Module is the RWSCD
- S - short-term storage of the data for a specific transaction in volatile memory
| Name | User | MDVM | WB | RWSCA | PNS | WI | HKS | PP | EP | RP | MPP | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| wi_data_enc_symk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure integrity and authenticity of local data at the WI at rest. |
| mdvm_challenge_symk | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure integrity and authenticity of mdvm_auth_challenge. |
| mdvm_auth_challenge | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Challenge containing a nonce and timestamp for ensuring freshness of requests towards MDVM, MACed with mdvm_challenge_symk. |
| mdvm_wi_id | - | P, L | - | - | L | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Universally unique identifier of a WI at the MDVM, also embedded in mdvm_token |
| mdvm_wi_state | - | P, L | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | MDVM-internal revocation state of the WI account. |
| wi_mdvm_auth_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating WI towards MDVM, WB and RWSCA. |
| wi_mdvm_auth_pubk | - | L | L | L | - | S | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating WI towards MDVM, WB and RWSCA. |
| wi_mdvm_parent_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for signing wi_android_key_attestation. |
| wi_mdvm_parent_pubk | - | L | - | - | - | S | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for for signing wi_android_key_attestation. |
| wi_mdvm_reattest_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for providing a wi_android_key_attestation towards MDVM. |
| wi_mdvm_reattest_pubk | - | S | - | - | - | S | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for for providing a wi_android_key_attestation towards MDVM. |
| wi_mdvm_register_pop | - | S | - | - | - | P | - | - | - | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_mdvm_auth_prvk for MDVM registration process. |
| wi_mdvm_auth_pop | - | S | - | - | - | P | - | - | - | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_wb_auth_prvk for renewal of MDVM token process. |
| wi_android_key_attestation | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Certificate chain for the Android key attestation about the wi_mdvm_auth_prvk/wi_mdvm_reattest_prvk and the integrity of WI and UD. |
| wi_device_class | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Information about the hardware and software versions of the UD and WI. |
| wi_platform_attestation_challenge | - | P, S | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | S | Challenge as input for platform attestation of the UD or MPP. |
| pap_attestation_auth_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | Private key of asymmetric key pair to sign MPP attestations. |
| pap_attestation_auth_pubk | - | L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | Public key of asymmetric key pair to verify MPP attestations. |
| pap_playintegrity_attestation | - | S | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | P, S | Android app attestation about the integrity of WI and UD. |
| wi_devicecheck_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for signing wi_devicecheck_assertion. | |
| wi_devicecheck_pubk | - | L | - | - | - | S | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for for signing wi_devicecheck_assertion. |
| pap_devicecheck_attestation | - | S | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | P, S | iOS DeviceCheck AppAttest attestation about the WI and wi_devicecheck_pubk. |
| wi_devicecheck_assertion | - | S | - | - | - | S | P, S | - | - | - | - | iOS DeviceCheck AppAttest assertion generated by HKS with wi_devicecheck_prvk. |
| mdvm_attestation_prvk | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of MDVM tokens towards WB and RWSCA. |
| mdvm_attestation_pubk | - | P, LH | L | L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of MDVM tokens towards WB and RWSCA. |
| mdvm_token | - | P, S | S | S | S | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Token signed by the MDVM that attests to the integrity and authenticity of the WI and its wi_mdvm_auth_prvk, and carries mdvm_wi_id. |
| wb_challenge_symk | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure integrity and authenticity of wb_auth_challenge. |
| wb_auth_challenge | - | - | P, S | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Challenge containing a nonce and timestamp for ensuring freshness of requests towards WB, MACed with wb_challenge_symk. |
| wb_wi_id | - | - | P, L | - | - | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Universally unique identifier of a WI at the WB. |
| wi_wb_auth_pop | - | - | S | - | - | P | - | - | - | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_mdvm_auth_prvk authenticating the request towards the WB for various WB operations. |
| wb_wi_state | - | - | P, L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | WB-internal revocation state of the WI account. |
| wi_wia_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating wi_wia_pop. |
| wi_wia_pubk | - | - | S | - | - | S | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating wi_wia_pop. |
| wi_wia_pop | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | S | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_wia_prvk, may include a challenge, e.g. from the PID Provider or EAA Provider. |
| wb_wia | - | - | P, S | - | - | S | - | S | S | - | - | Short lived Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA), only used once, signed by wb_wia_auth_prvk. |
| wb_wia_status | - | - | P, L | - | - | S | - | L | L | - | - | Long-lived status information on the Wallet Instance, included in the Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA). |
| wb_wia_tsl | - | - | P, L | - | - | - | - | S | S | - | - | Status List Token published by the WB that aggregates the wb_wia_status of all referenced Wallet Instances, signed by wb_wia_tsl_prvk. |
| wb_client_instance_id | - | - | P, L | - | - | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Universally unique identifier generated by the WB that identifies a (WI, Credential Issuer) pairing and references the associated wb_wia_status; provided by the WI on WIA renewal so the WB reuses the same status entry without parsing a previous wb_wia. |
| wb_wia_auth_prvk | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of Wallet Instance Attestations towards Issuers and Relying Parties. |
| wb_wia_auth_pubk | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | L | L | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of Wallet Instance Attestations towards Issuers. |
| wb_wia_tsl_prvk | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of the Wallet Instance Attestation Status List Token. |
| wb_wia_tsl_pubk | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | L | L | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair to ensure integrity and authenticity of the Wallet Instance Attestation Status List Token. |
| wb_wi_revocation_secret | - | - | P, L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Secret for authenticating the Wallet Instance revocation. The WB only stores the hash of wb_wi_revocation_secret. |
| wb_wi_revocation_code | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Bech32-encoding of wb_wi_revocation_secret, used as the user input for authenticating the Wallet Instance revocation at the WB revocation service. |
| rwscd_challenge_symk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure integrity and authenticity of rwsca_auth_challenge. |
| rwsca_auth_challenge | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Challenge containing a nonce and timestamp for ensuring freshness of requests towards RWSCA, MACed with rwscd_challenge_symk. |
| wi_rwsca_auth_pop | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_mdvm_auth_prvk and wi_rwsca_pin_prvk authenticating the request towards the RWSCA for the process of Remote WSCA operation. |
| user_rwsca_pin | P,L | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Knowledge factor of user's MFA to approve presentations of credentials bound to the RWSCA. |
| wi_rwsca_pin_salt | - | - | - | - | - | P, LE | - | - | - | - | - | Cryptographic key used as salt for deriving wi_rwsca_pin_prvk and wi_rwsca_pin_pubk based on user_rwsca_pin entered by the user. |
| wi_rwsca_pin_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the user’s user_rwsca_pin to the RWSCA. |
| wi_rwsca_pin_pubk | - | - | - | L | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the user’s user_rwsca_pin to the RWSCA. |
| rwsca_account_id | - | - | - | P, L | - | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Universally unique identifier of a WI at the RWSCA. |
| rwsca_account_state | - | - | - | P, L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | RWSCA-internal revocation state of the WI account. |
| rwsca_pin_retry_counter | S | - | - | P, L | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Retry Counter for the user_rwsca_pin, managed by the RWSCA. |
| rwscd_pin_symk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the rwsca_pin_session_token. |
| rwsca_pin_session_token | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | - | - | - | - | Short-lived session token, that attests the user authentication of wi_rwsca_pin_prvk for a short time, managed by the RWSCA. |
| wi_rwsca_operation_params | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | An operation that is requested by the WI to be performed by the RWSCA, e.g. to create keys or sign data. |
| rwscd_master_key | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key in the RWSCD that is used to encrypt and authenticate all wrapped private keys that the RWSCD generates. |
| rwscd_wrapped_key | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Wrapped key blob for a private key of asymmetric key pair that was generated by the RWSCD using rwscd_master_key and is exported to the RWSCA. |
| rwscd_aead_symk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key in the RWSCA that is used to encrypt and authenticate all rwscd_wrapped_key together with the rwsca_account_id. |
| rwsca_bound_wrapped_key | - | - | - | P, S | - | LE | - | - | - | - | - | Wrapped key blob for a private key of asymmetric key pair that was generated by the RWSCD and is associated to a rwsca_account_id and is exported to the WI. |
| rwsca_wte | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | S | - | - | - | Wallet Trust Evidence for issuing PID refresh token and batch credentials, only used once, signed by rwscd_wte_auth_prvk, containing rwsca_wte_status. |
| rwsca_wte_status | - | - | - | P, L | - | S | - | L | - | - | - | Long-lived status information on the WSCD, included in the Wallet Trust Evidence (WTE). |
| pns_challenge_symk | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | Symmetric key to ensure integrity and authenticity of pns_auth_challenge. |
| pns_auth_challenge | - | - | - | - | P, S | S | - | - | - | - | - | Challenge containing a nonce and timestamp for ensuring freshness of requests towards PNS, MACed with pns_challenge_symk. |
| wi_pns_auth_pop | - | - | - | - | S | P | - | - | - | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_mdvm_auth_prvk authenticating the request towards the PNS for various PNS operations. |
| mpp_registration_token | - | - | - | - | L | LE | - | - | - | - | P, L | Token identifying the WI at the push notification service of the mobile OS, used by the PNS to send push notifications to a specific WI; re-registered by the WI after one month to prevent staleness. |
| pp_meta_data | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, L | - | - | - | Public configuration and metadata of the PP, provided as signed metadata and verified via pp_access_cert. |
| ep_meta_data | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, L | - | - | Public configuration and metadata of the EP, provided as signed metadata and verified via ep_access_cert. |
| pp_access_cert_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the PP, used to sign the signed metadata pp_meta_data. |
| ep_access_cert_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the EP, used to sign the signed metadata ep_meta_data. |
| pp_access_cert_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the PP, used by the WI to verify the signed metadata pp_meta_data. |
| ep_access_cert_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the EP, used by the WI to verify the signed metadata ep_meta_data. |
| pp_access_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | L | - | - | - | Certificate for authenticating the identity of the PP, used to sign the PP metadata. |
| ep_access_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | L | - | - | Certificate for authenticating the identity of the EP, used to sign the EP metadata. |
| pp_registration_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | L | - | - | - | Certificate for authenticating the identity of the PP, used for consent display. |
| ep_registration_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | L | - | - | Certificate for authenticating the identity of the EP, used for consent display. |
| pp_wia_pop_challenge | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Challenge provided by PP to be used by WI for the WIA proof of possession. |
| ep_wia_pop_nonce | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Challenge provided by EP to be used by WI for the WIA proof of possession. |
| wi_pkce_code_verifier | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | S | - | - | Nonce to ensure secure binding between Authorization and Token Request. |
| wi_pkce_code_challenge | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | S | - | - | Hash of the PKCE Code Verifier acting as a challenge to ensure secure binding between Authorization and Token Request. |
| wb_client_id | - | - | P, L | - | - | L | - | S | S | - | - | OAuth client identifier that represents the Wallet Solution. |
| wb_redirect_uri | - | - | P, L | - | - | L | - | S | S | - | - | Claimed HTTPS URI (realized via Android App Links / iOS Universal Links) registered as the OAuth redirect_uri of the Wallet Solution, used by the PP or EP to redirect the browser back to the WI after authorization. |
| pp_par_request_uri | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | URL linking to the PP and an associated issuance session from the Pushed Authorization Request as part of the OpenID4VCI protocol. |
| ep_par_request_uri | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | URL linking to the EP and an associated issuance session from the Pushed Authorization Request as part of the OpenID4VCI protocol. |
| es_tc_token | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Token used to transmit the information required to establish a trustworthy channel between the WI and the eID-Server. |
| pp_refresh_url | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | URL linking to the PP and an associated issuance session from the German eID protocol. |
| user_eid_pin | P, L | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Knowledge factor of user's German eID Card to authorize presentation of eID data. |
| es_eid_data | L | - | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | S | - | The eID data read by the eID-Server from the eID Card containing the user's personal attributes. The data is actually stored in the user's eID card. |
| pp_authorization_code | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Token issued by the PP after the successful authorization phase in the Authorization Code Flow. |
| ep_authorization_code | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Token issued by the EP after the successful authorization phase in the Authorization Code Flow. |
| ep_pre-auth_code | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Pre-authorized code issued by the EP in the Credential Offer, authorizing the Token Request in the Pre-Authorized Code Flow. |
| ep_tx_code | S | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Transaction Code communicated by the EP to the user out-of-band, entered by the user in the WI to bind the Credential Offer to the user in the Pre-Authorized Code Flow. |
| wi_fake_dpop | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | - | - | Proof of possession of a local key, only used to receive a pp_dpop_nonce from PP (protocol-related necessity). |
| pp_dpop_nonce | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Challenge provided by PP to be used by WI for the DPoP proof of possession of PID access/refresh tokens. |
| ep_dpop_nonce | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Challenge provided by EP to be used by WI for the DPoP proof of possession of EAA access/refresh tokens. |
| rwscd_rt_prvk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for securing access/refresh tokens. |
| rwscd_rt_pubk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | S | - | S | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for securing access/refresh tokens. |
| rwscd_wte_auth_prvk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of WTEs securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| rwscd_wte_auth_pubk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | L | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of WTEs securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| wi_rt_dpop | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | - | - | Proof of possession of rwscd_rt_prvk authenticating the PID access/refresh token towards the PP. |
| wi_dpop_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for the DPoP proof sender-constraining EAA access tokens, managed in the local HKS. |
| wi_dpop_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | S | P, LH | - | S | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for the DPoP proof sender-constraining EAA access tokens. |
| wi_dpop | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | S | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_dpop_prvk sender-constraining the EAA access token towards the EP. |
| pp_access_token | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Token issued by the PP that authorizes issuance of PID credentials, sender-constrained to rwscd_rt_pubk via DPoP. |
| pp_refresh_token | - | - | - | - | - | LE | - | P, S | - | - | - | Token issued by the PP that authorizes issuance of new access tokens for PID credentials, sender-constrained to rwscd_rt_pubk via DPoP. |
| pp_c_nonce | - | - | - | S | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | Challenge provided by PP to be used by WI for freshness of the PID device binding proofs and key attestations (via RWSCD, e.g. rwsca_wte and rwscd_pid_device_pubk[]). |
| ep_c_nonce | - | - | - | S | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Challenge provided by EP to be used by WI for freshness of the EAA holder binding proofs of possession. |
| ep_access_token | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | P, S | - | - | Token issued by the EP that authorizes issuance of EAA credentials, sender-constrained to wi_dpop_pubk via DPoP. |
| ep_refresh_token | - | - | - | - | - | LE | - | - | P, S | - | - | Token issued by the EP that authorizes re-issuance of new access tokens for EAA credentials without user authentication. |
| rwscd_pid_device_prvk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for securing presentations of pp_pid_credential. |
| rwscd_pid_device_pubk | - | - | - | P, LH | - | LE | - | S | - | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for securing presentations of pp_pid_credential. |
| wi_eaa_device_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for cryptographic holder binding of EAA credentials, managed in the local HKS. |
| wi_eaa_device_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | S | P, LH | - | S | - | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for cryptographic holder binding of EAA credentials. |
| wi_eaa_device_pop | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | S | - | - | Proof of possession of wi_eaa_device_prvk for holder binding, provided to the EP in the Credential Request. |
| pp_pid_credential | - | - | - | - | - | LE | - | P, S | - | - | - | Long-lived PID Credential, only used once, signed by pp_pid_auth_prvk. |
| pp_pid_auth_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of pp_pid_credential securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| pp_pid_auth_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | L | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of pp_pid_credential securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| ep_eaa_credential | - | - | - | - | - | LE | - | - | P, S | - | - | Long-lived EAA credential, in case of batch issuance used only once, signed by ep_eaa_auth_prvk. |
| ep_eaa_auth_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of ep_eaa_credential securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| ep_eaa_auth_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, LH | L | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for issuance of ep_eaa_credential securing its integrity and authenticity. |
| rp_response_enc_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for application-level encryption of PID presentation. |
| rp_response_enc_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for application-level encryption of PID presentation. |
| rp_access_cert_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P,LH | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the RP. |
| rp_access_cert_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | P,LH | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for authenticating the RP, used to verify the signed request object rp_openid4vp_request. |
| rp_access_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | L | - | Certificate for authenticating the identity of the RP. |
| rp_registration_cert | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | L | - | Certificate for authenticating the intended use and registered attributes of the RP, used for consent display. |
| rp_client_id | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | L | - | OAuth client identifier that represents the RP. |
| rp_openid4vp_request | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | OpenID4VP request signed by rp_access_cert_prvk. |
| rp_cookie_id | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | HTTP cookie identifying the browser session. |
| rp_openid4vp_state | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | Nonce identifying the OpenID4VP session. |
| rp_dcql_query | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | JSON data structure provided by RP that defines the requested credentials. |
| rp_key_binding_nonce | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | Challenge provided by RP for the keybinding proof of possession. |
| rp_request_uri | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | URL linking to the rp_openid4vp_request. |
| wi_key_binding_data | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | JSON data structure used for key binding of pp_pid_credential. |
| wi_key_binding_data_hash | - | - | - | S | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | Hash of wi_key_binding_data. |
| rwscd_key_binding_signature | - | - | - | P, S | - | S | - | - | - | S | - | Signature of wi_key_binding_data using rwscd_pid_device_prvk. |
| wi_pid_presentation | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | Presentation of pp_pid_credential with key binding. |
| wi_response_enc_prvk | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | - | - | Private key of asymmetric key pair for application-level encryption of PID presentation. |
| wi_response_enc_pubk | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | Public key of asymmetric key pair for application-level encryption of PID presentation. |
| wi_openid4vp_response | - | - | - | - | - | P, S | - | - | - | S | - | OpenID4VP Response containing encrypted wi_pid_presentation. |
| rp_response_uri | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, L | - | URL provided by the RP for the Wallet to send wi_openid4vp_response to. |
| rp_redirect_uri | - | - | - | - | - | S | - | - | - | P, S | - | URL provided by the RP for the Wallet to redirect into the browser session. |